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MISBEHAVIOR, EDUCATION, AND LABOR
MARKET OUTCOMES
Carmit Segal
University of Zurich
Abstract
Using data on young men from the National Education Longitudinal Survey, this paper
investigates the relationship between childhood misbehavior and later education and labor market
outcomes. The main nding is that eighth-grade misbehavior is important for earnings over
and above eighth-grade test scores. Moreover, controlling for educational attainment, childhood
misbehavior is associated with earnings at all educational levels, whereas achievement test scores
are related to earnings only for young men with postsecondary degrees. Possible explanations for
the association between eighth-grade misbehavior and economic success are explored. (JEL: J24,
J31, J13, I21)
1. Introduction
In recent years, researchers have noted that socially productive skills include not only
the traditionally investigated cognitive skills but also noncognitive ones. This broader
concept of human capital has naturally inuenced the research of labor economists and
macroeconomists both. The macroeconomic literature investigates how personality
traits such as work ethic, patience, and the individual's discount rate aect economic
growth. Thus, Becker and Mulligan (1997) argue that the evidence on cross-country
dierences in growth and on within-country consumption and earning inequalities is
consistent with individuals having varying discount rates (and with their model, in
which individuals can decide their discount rate). Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) explain
the rise of the middle class and the decline of the aristocracy in the aftermath of the
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Industrial-Revolution as a result of dierent investment in skills. The authors suggest
that while upper-class families cultivated in their ospring a taste for leisure, middle-
class families instilled values of patience and hard work that enabled their ospring to
succeed economically in the industrialized world. In support of the view that religious
belief inuences traits (e.g., a work ethic) important for economic growth, Barro and
McCleary (2003) document that, across countries, growth is positively correlated with
the prevalence of beliefs in heaven and hell. In labor economics, a new literature has
emerged that documents the importance of noncognitive skills to various economic
outcomes (see, e.g., Heckman, 2000; Bowles et al., 2001a; Cawley et al., 2001; Heckman
and Rubinstein, 2001; Jacob, 2002; Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Persico et al., 2004;
Kuhn and Weinberger, 2005; Heckman et al., 2006; Lindqvist and Westman, 2011).
The noncognitive traits investigated to date, in this literature, include social and
leadership skills and various personality traits such as aggression, externality, self-
esteem, and locus of control. Whereas such traits are important from a psychological
view point, the ones that were deemed important for economic growth (i.e., self-
control, patience, and hard work) were not investigated. This paper contributes to
the literature on the relationship between noncognitive skills and economic success by
focusing on proxies for these exact traits.1 Moreover, whereas the previous literature
used measures that rely on self-reporting { that in some cases were reective of, or
even concurrent with, the outcomes of interest2 { this paper uses pre-market eighth-
grade teacher evaluations to measure noncognitive skills.
The analysis in this paper is based on young men in the National Educational
Longitudinal Survey (NELS) data set;3 this panel data set spans a period of twelve
years, beginning when participants were in eighth grade. It contains information on
participants while they were still in school as well as information on educational
1. The macroeconomic literature on quasi-hyperbolic discounting focuses on another aspect of
discounting: the consequences of individuals' tendency to discount the future to a greater extent
when making trade-os that involve the present (for an excellent summary of the theory and
evidence see DellaVigna, 2009). I know of no direct evidence connecting the noncognitive measures
used in this paper to the tendency to be hyperbolic, though some indirect evidence may be found
in Ameriks et al. (2007).
2. An exception is Lindqvist and Westman (2011), who use psychologist evaluations of the
leadership skills of potential recruits to the Swedish army as a measure of noncognitive skills.
3. A number of papers have cautioned against inferences made from female earnings to oered
wages, because of severe selection problems. Specically relevant for this paper is the work of
Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), who suggest that selection is an important determinant of female
wages and that relationships between (cognitive) skills and wages for women are nontrivial.
Unfortunately, there are no papers that investigate, for females, the role of noncognitive skills
in either labor market selection or educational attainment choices. Issues related to female labor
supply and educational choices are therefore beyond the scope of this paper. That being said, girls do
behave signicantly better than boys on all measures other than absenteeism. A possible explanation
for girls' higher absenteeism rates is biological; in particular, menstruating young women may be
more likely to miss school (for documentation in adults, see Ichino and Moretti, 2009).
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attainment and labor market outcomes. Standardized achievement tests were
administered to all participants, whose parents, teachers, and school administrators
were also surveyed. Teacher evaluations of student behavior in eighth grade are used
to create a pre-market measure of participants' behavior, thereby avoiding possible
problems associated with self-reporting. The teachers evaluated their students on
ve attributes: absenteeism, disruptiveness, inattentiveness, tardiness, and homework
completion. Thus, the evaluations provide a broad measure of student behavior in the
classroom.4
In this paper, I investigate the relationship between misbehavior in eighth grade
and educational and labor market outcomes. After controlling for eighth-grade test
scores and family characteristics, I nd that misbehavior in eighth grade is negatively
correlated with educational attainment. Moreover, after controlling for eighth-grade
test scores, I nd that misbehavior in eighth grade is negatively correlated with
earnings of young men who are 26{27 years old. Furthermore, once individuals'
education levels are controlled for, misbehavior in eighth grade is associated with
lower earnings for young men of all education levels, whereas performance on the
eighth-grade achievement tests is associated with earnings only for young men with
postsecondary degrees.
The forms of misbehavior investigated in this paper are minor in comparison
to the criminal behavior, drug abuse, violence, and aggression that have received
so much attention in the literature (for an excellent summary of the research on
antisocial behavior in children and youth, see Dodge, 2006). Nevertheless, classroom
misbehavior { especially when it reects the absence of traits that are important in the
labor market { may have severe consequences.5 Indeed, substantial resources in the
area of organizational behavior are devoted to developing tools that enable employers
to identify individuals that will display counterproductive work behavior, such as
absenteeism, tardiness, disciplinary problems, theft, sexual harassment, accidents,
sabotage, drug or alcohol abuse, violence, or white collar crime (see Roberts et al.
(2007) and there the work cited). There is evidence (Ones et al., 2007) that individuals
4. I discuss the reliability of teacher evaluations in Section 3.
5. It seems that the good behavior required in school is not unlike the good behavior
required in the workplace. In both settings, students/employees are required to be on time and
not miss school/work without a valid excuse. In both, students/employees are assigned work
(homework/job tasks) that needs to be completed by a certain deadline. One's standing with
the teacher/employer is determined by the quality of one's work and by the behavior one displays
in the classroom/workplace. Furthermore, theories from sociology of education suggest that schools
are not only where knowledge is acquired but also where young members of society are prepared
to take part in the political and economic spheres of society (see Parsons, 1959; Bowles and Gintis,
1976; Dreeben, 1976). Hence, these theories imply that one task of schools is to teach students how
to behave in the workplace. Individuals who have failed to acquire these skills (i.e., who have not
learned to follow these rules of society) by the eighth grade may not be able to acquire them in the
future and so may have worse outcomes.
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who display counterproductive work behavior are less conscientious.6 Roberts et al.
document that low conscientiousness at age 18 predicts counterproductive work
behavior at age 26.7 These authors also document that adolescent conduct disorder
(which includes antisocial behavior in addition to violation of school rules) correlates
with counterproductive work behavior and with low levels of conscientiousness at
age 18. Barbaranelli et al. (2003) show that low conscientiousness in junior high
correlates with both externalizing behavior (which includes misbehavior in school)
and low grades in school.
In economics, traits like self-control and inclination to plan are described by the
discount rate. The evidence in economics suggests that eighth-grade misbehavior may
relate to low discount rates. Specically, Castillo et al. (2011) elicit discount rates
of the entire eighth-grade student population of one school district in Georgia by
oering the eighth-graders choices between receiving $49 after a month and receiving
a larger amount of money that varied (between $50.83 and $98.02) after seven months.
The authors nd that eighth-graders with higher discount rates have higher rates of
disciplinary referrals in both the eighth and ninth grades.8
Taken together, the economics and psychology literatures suggest that individuals
with high discount rates are more likely to be conscientious and that misbehavior is
negatively correlated with this trait. Hence, the favored explanation in this paper is
that eighth-grade misbehavior is indicative of inappropriate behavior displayed later
on in school and at the workplace. Thus, misbehaving students are boys with low
discount rates, which in turn are related to low levels of conscientiousness (i.e., low
noncognitive skills).
Section 2 is devoted to investigating mechanisms that may be responsible for
the associations found in the data. I present a model that follows the skill-weights
approach suggested by Lazear (2009). In the model, individuals are endowed with both
cognitive and noncognitive human capital. Firms use both forms of human capital
to produce output, but the relative importance of each varies across rms. Before
starting to work, an individual must decide whether or not to invest in schooling
{ a technology that enhances one's cognitive skills { while taking into account the
6. In psychology, the term \conscientious" is used to describe the tendency to follow rules and
to be task- and goal-directed, inclined to plan, and self-controlled (Roberts et al., 2004). Ones
et al. (2007) summarize evidence on the strong relationship between conscientiousness and other
job performance criteria.
7. This accords with ndings that conscientiousness is a personality trait that, more than any
other, seems to persist throughout one's life (see, Roberts et al., 2004, for a review of the empirical
evidence).
8. In addition, Castillo et al. (2011) nd that \impatience patterns" by race and gender are
similar to those displayed by eighth-grade misbehavior. Specically, they nd that boys and African-
Americans are more likely to be impatient.
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costs and expected benets. Interpreting the eighth-grade behavior and test scores
as proxies for the stock (accumulated by that grade) of noncognitive and cognitive
human capital, respectively, the model is able to explain the empirical ndings. Lower
schooling levels are the result of lower expected returns to schooling and (possibly)
of the higher costs associated with lower levels of cognitive and noncognitive skills.
Misbehavior is correlated also with lower educational attainment because it implies
higher discounting of the returns to schooling. Lower earnings are the result of lower
productivity, which is directly associated with one's cognitive and noncognitive human
capital. I then extend the model to provide a mechanism by which noncognitive skills
can aect cognitive human capital accumulation. In the extended model, individuals
can enhance their cognitive human capital at each level of schooling by exerting costly
eort. Thus, those who value the future less (i.e., those with low noncognitive skills)
invest less eort in school and hence accumulate less cognitive human capital; as a
result, they earn less. The existence of individual dierences in discount rates therefore
generates cognitive human capital dierentials in addition to those stemming from
dierent schooling levels and dierent endowments.
The extended model also emphasizes that one should not expect all noncognitive
traits to have the same relationship with outcomes. In particular, it suggests that
misbehavior { through its connection to the discount rate { may result in lower
cognitive human capital, which will lead to even lower earnings than already predicted
by the lower productivity associated with misbehavior. This relation between
cognitive human capital and misbehavior need not hold for other noncognitive
traits. Thus, for example, we expect traits like social skills and leadership to be
correlated with earnings through their eect on productivity in jobs where these
traits are essential, though they may not aect earnings in other jobs. Implicitly,
then, the extended model suggests that distinctions should be made between dierent
noncognitive traits and that (for the purpose of analysis) they should not necessarily
be bundled together.
Alternative interpretations are investigated in Section 5. First, the associations
just summarized may not mean that classroom misbehavior itself causes worse
outcomes. It is possible that misbehavior is merely a by-product of an omitted variable
or of a variable measured with an error that is causally related to outcomes. Besides
the discount rate, candidate variables include preference parameters (or expectations)
and low cognitive skills. Specically, it is possible that the correlations in the data are
driven by boys' tastes for occupations or schooling irrespective of their (cognitive or
noncognitive) skills. This mechanism is similar to that of the extended model. Though
in this mechanism, tastes and expectations (and not the discount rate) change, in
practice, the returns from behaving well in school. Boys who value neither schooling
nor the knowledge acquired thereby (either in itself or as a means to an end) may
decide not to invest eort and to misbehave. This would lead them to accumulate
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less cognitive human capital and hence reduce their future earnings (and potentially
their educational attainment). I nd no evidence that such channels exist. Even after
controlling for eighth-graders' stated expected occupation at age 30 or their stated
expected education levels, the results remain intact.
A second possible explanation is that misbehavior in school is merely a by-
product of low cognitive skills (i.e., those who have a hard time understanding the
material taught in school misbehave). This is a valid criticism of all the literature on
noncognitive skills. If success were determined solely by cognitive skills then it follows
that { because any psychological measure may be aected negatively by failure in
school or in the workplace { worse psychological traits would imply low cognitive skills.
It seems impossible that eighth-grade test scores are perfect measures of cognitive
ability and that misbehavior is simply a by-product of low cognitive ability. If that
were the case then there would not have been, after controlling for eighth-grade
test scores, any associations between eighth-grade misbehavior and later outcomes.
Thus, one can only argue that cognitive ability is measured with error by eighth-
grade test scores and misbehavior both. However, the ndings reported here suggest
that to believe this requires one to believe also that, for less-educated individuals,
eighth-grade misbehavior is not just a better proxy (than eighth-grade test scores)
for cognitive skills but in fact is the only (viable) proxy.
Even if the ndings reported in this paper imply that misbehavior in eighth grade
results in lower educational attainment and earnings, we still need to ask whether it
is possible for an isolated incident of misbehavior in the eighth grade to be the causes
of worse outcomes more than a decade later { that is, without individuals displaying
inappropriate behavior (in school and possibly in the workplace) during subsequent
years. If it is possible, then misbehavior in eighth grade would not necessarily indicate
one's type (i.e., discount rate or personality traits). To the best of my knowledge, there
is no evidence in the literature suggesting that the eighth grade is special in terms of
educational progress and that misbehavior at this stage dooms one for life. A more
plausible explanation is that being inattentive in class, missing school, and not doing
one's homework (i.e., misbehaving) may result in less accumulated knowledge. After
controlling for family background characteristics, school xed eects, and eighth-grade
test scores, I nd that eighth-grade misbehavior is associated with lower tenth-grade
test scores. However, neither one's background nor one's above-average knowledge in
eighth grade mitigates this eect. It thus seems that those who misbehave not only
accumulate less knowledge but they also continue to misbehave.9 So we return to the
9. The results in Segal (2008) suggest that this is indeed the case. Using the NELS teacher
evaluations of student behavior in 1988 (when participants were in eighth grade) and 1990 (when
most participants were in tenth grade), the author shows that boys' behavior in school is fairly
stable at least after the eighth grade. That work also shows that even though family and school
characteristics, as well as the incentives for good behavior provided at home and in school,
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explanation that those who misbehave in eighth grade keep misbehaving later on in
school and still later in the workplace, and therefore earn less.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3
describes the NELS data set. Section 4 gives a detailed analysis of the relationship
between misbehavior in eighth grade and outcomes. Section 5 explores the channels
that could account for the association between misbehavior and outcomes and oers
some interpretations. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
In this section I present a model demonstrating how cognitive and noncognitive skills
may aect economic outcomes and then discuss its relationship to possible empirical
specications. The purpose is to understand what relationships may exist in the
data between economic outcomes and eighth-grade misbehavior and test scores. To
achieve this goal, I do not write the most general model possible. Instead, I make
specic assumptions that are motivated by evidence in the literature and the data
available in the NELS.
2.1. The Basic Model
Individuals live for two periods. In the rst period, an individual must decide whether
to invest in schooling or not; in the second period, he works. Individuals are endowed
with a two-dimensional skill vector (A; ) 2 R2++, where A and  denote (respectively)
the individual's cognitive and noncognitive skills. Higher values of A and  are
associated with better outcomes. Given the data, a sensible interpretation of the
endowments  and A is that  represents noncognitive human capital accumulated
by the eighth grade while A represents the corresponding cognitive human capital.10
When deciding whether to invest in education, each individual takes into account
the associated benets and costs. Benets could be of two kinds: an increase in
cognitive human capital (denoted by HC) and/or an increase in noncognitive human
capital (denoted by HNC). When discussing the link to the data, the decision to
invest in schooling is interpreted as the decision to obtain a postsecondary degree. It
therefore seems natural to assume that schooling increases an individual's cognitive
human capital. However, since research (Segal, 2008) indicates that boys' behavior
in school is quite stable at least after the eighth grade, I assume that postsecondary
are important determinants of behavior in the classroom neither the cross-sectional variation in
behavior nor the variation in behavior over time can be attributed to these covariates.
10. This interpretation assumes that the production process of future human capital depends
directly on the current stock { not the initial levels { of human capital.
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education does not change one's noncognitive human capital; hence HNC = .
11
The production function of cognitive human capital is a function of A; ; and S;
where S denotes schooling. For simplicity I assume that S 2 f0; 1g, where S = 1 if
the individual acquired schooling at a cost C(A; ) and S = 0 otherwise. The costs
associated with the schooling investment are (weakly) decreasing in cognitive and
noncognitive skills; that is, CA  0 and C  0, respectively.12
Firms use both cognitive and noncognitive human capital to produce output.
Following the skill-weights approach suggested by Lazear (2009), I assume that rms
are heterogeneous in the sense that they use dierent weights of the two skills in
production. Thus I assume that there is a continuum of rms each characterized by
, a random variable with well-behaved density and cumulative distribution functions.
The output at rm i of a worker with a skill set (HC ;HNC) is given by
yi = iHC + (1  i)HNC ; (1)
with 0  i  1. The term i reects the fact that rms may weigh the two skills
dierently, from which it follows that individuals may have dierent productivities in
dierent rms.
In the second period (i.e., the working period), each worker receives one job oer
and decides whether to accept or reject it. Because the situation is one of an ex
post bilateral monopoly, the wage is determined by some equilibrium bargaining
game. For tractability I assume that the wage is determined by Nash bargaining,
although the results remain qualitatively the same as long as some rent splitting
occurs. Denote the rm at which the worker is employed during the second period
as rm 1. The worker's output at rm 1 is: y1 = 1HC + (1   1)HNC : The
worker's outside option is unemployment, which is normalized to have value 0. Hence
Nash bargaining implies that, in the second period, the worker's wage is given by
w = 0:5[1HC + (1   1)HNC ]. Assuming that A  0 and   0, all individuals
decide to work in the second period.
The production function of cognitive human capital is given by
HC =
(
g(A; ) if S = 1
A if S = 0:
(2)
11. This does not preclude the possibility that schooling and parental investment at earlier ages
do aect noncognitive and cognitive human capital accumulation or that postsecondary education
increases other, noncognitive skills such as social and leadership skills. This assumption is in
line with the interpretation that eighth-grade misbehavior proxies for noncognitive human capital
(accumulated by the eighth grade) and not for raw noncognitive ability.
12. Because higher values of both A and  contribute to higher productivity (i.e., are associated
with better outcomes), the signs on the partial derivatives of the cost function are opposite to the
usual signs.
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To guarantee that indeed g(A; ) > A for all A and , I assume that gA > 1; this
implies that cognitive human capital is increasing in A. In addition I assume that
g  0, which means that those with higher  acquire (weakly) higher cognitive
human capital for the same level of A. Thus, schooling results in higher cognitive
human capital for all values of cognitive and noncognitive skills, yet the increase in
cognitive human capital due to schooling is higher for those with higher skills. Because
the worker must decide on his human capital investment strategy before observing
the realizations of , his problem is
max
S=f1;0g
Ew(S) C; (3)
where  is the discount rate (given that the costs are in the present and the benets are
in the future) and Ew(S) = 0:5[E1HC + (1 E1)] is the expected wage in period
2 (after substituting HNC = ). Since E1  1, the expected wage is nonnegative for
all workers.
In the rst period, the individual chooses whether or not to invest in schooling.
His expected wage is given by
Ew =
8<:
1
2 [E1g(A; ) + (1 E1)] if S = 1
1
2 [E1A+ (1 E1)] if S = 0:
(4)
The expected increase in earnings is: w = Ew(S = 1) Ew(S = 0) = 0:5[g(A; ) 
A]E1. Since g(A; ) > A, it follows that w > 0 for all A and .
If acquiring (cognitive) human capital were costless, then all individuals (with
positive discount rates) would nd it benecial to attend school. Schooling is a costly
investment and so, for the individual who invests in schooling,
1
2 ][(A; ) A]E1  C(A; ): (5)
First, suppose that the costs of schooling do not vary with  and are given by c(A),
with cA < 0: In this case, there is only one value of A for which equation (5) holds
with equality; this value is dened as A; and it solves
1
2 [g(A
) A]E1 = c(A): (6a)
Since the left-hand side of equation (6a) is increasing in A and the right-hand side is
decreasing in A, individuals for whom A  A will choose to invest in schooling and
the rest not. Hence, we should see sorting into dierent education levels according to
the values of A.
Now suppose that the cost function and/or the discount rate  varies with . In
this case, A() is dened implicitly by
1
2() [g(A
(); ) A()]E1 = C(A(); ): (6b)
Journal of the European Economic Association
Preprint prepared on May 16, 2012 using jeea.cls v1.0.
Segal Misbehavior, Education, and Labor Market Outcomes 10
Again, the left-hand side of equation (6b) is increasing in A() and the right-hand
side is decreasing in A(): Thus, for a given value of , all individuals for whom
A()  A() will choose to invest in schooling and all other individuals will choose
not to do so. A varies with  as follows:
dA
d
=   [
1
2(g  A) + 12g]E1  C
1
2(gA   1)E1  CA
: (7)
The evidence in Castillo et al. (2011) suggests that misbehaving students have
lower discount rates, which means that  > 0. By assumption, g(A) > A; gA >
1; g > 0; CA  0; and C  0. Therefore, dA=d < 0. Observe that this result
holds even if  is the only variable that depends on . Hence, the cuto level of
schooling investment, A, is decreasing in . As a result, conditional on A, we should
see sorting into dierent education levels according to ; conditional on ; we should
see sorting into dierent education levels according to A. Note that in comparison
to the previous case, in which neither the costs of schooling nor the discount rate
varied with , here the individuals that are most aected by having low values of 
are those whose cognitive skills have values just above A dened by equation (6a).
In the former case, they all would have chosen to invest in schooling, but in the latter
case some decide not to invest in schooling. On the other hand, individuals with high
noncognitive human capital may decide to acquire postsecondary education even if
they have relatively low cognitive human capital (i.e., less than A).
We can now rewrite equation (4) as
Ew (S) = 12E1A+
1
2(1 E1) + 12 (g(A; ) A)SE1; (8)
where S = 1 if the individual decides to invest in schooling, and S = 0 otherwise. The
implications of equation (8) for the earnings regressions are discussed in Section 2.3.
2.2. An Extended Model with Eort Choice
In the basic model, the relationship between cognitive and noncognitive skills follows
from the assumption that noncognitive skills are an input in the production function
of cognitive human capital. However, this is not the only way that such a relationship
could be generated. In this section I endogenize that relationship by introducing eort
into the basic model. In order to sharpen the result, I allow only the discount rate
(and not the production and the cost-of-eort functions) to depend on . I therefore
assume that g(A; ) depends only on A (i.e., it is g(A)), and similarly that the costs
of schooling are given by c(A). However, I allow the production function of human
capital to depend on (costly) eort, denoted by e. To simplify, I assume an additive
production function in e (the results are qualitatively the same if a multiplicative
function is used). Thus, the production function of cognitive human capital is now
Journal of the European Economic Association
Preprint prepared on May 16, 2012 using jeea.cls v1.0.
Segal Misbehavior, Education, and Labor Market Outcomes 11
given by
HC =
(
g(A) + e if S = 1
A+ e if S = 0;
(9)
where the eort level e 2 [0; e] and g(A)>A+ e. Thus, higher eort increases cognitive
human capital but not more than schooling does. The costs of eort are given by
0:25Ke2, where K is a positive constant. The rest of the setting is the same as in the
basic model. The worker determines his optimal eort level for each education level,
then compares the costs to the benets, and then makes his investment decision. The
worker's rst-stage problem is therefore
max
e2[0;e]
8<:

2 [E1(g(A) + e) + (1 E1)]  c(A)  14Ke2 if S = 1

2 [E1(A+ e) + (1 E1)]  14Ke2 if S = 0
(10)
Because of the additive form of the production function, the optimal eort choice is
identical in both cases and is given by e:
e =

K
; (11)
where e is the solution to the rst-order conditions (assuming that   eK; otherwise,
e = e).13 The optimal eort level depends on  via , which means that e is
increasing in .14
We substitute this eort choice into equation (9) and thereby obtain
HC =
(
g(A) + e = g(A) + K if S = 1
A+ e = A+ K if S = 0:
(12)
This equation implies that, even within the same educational category, cognitive
human capital depends on  through its dependence on . Since de=d > 0, cognitive
human capital is increasing in .
After substituting for the optimal eort choice, we obtain that in the second period
the worker's problem is
maxf2 [E1A+ (1 E1)] + 
2
4K ,

2 [E1g(A) + (1 E1)]  c(A) + 
2
4K g; (13)
where the rst term represents the choice of no schooling and the second an
investment in schooling. Thus the individual will choose to invest in schooling if
13. The second-order condition is  K < 0, which guarantees that e is indeed a maximum.
14. If K depends on A and/or  then it is reasonable to assume that the costs of eort are
decreasing in A and/or  (i.e., that KA < 0 and K < 0). Under these assumptions, e
 is increasing
in both A and .
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0:5[g(A) A]E1  c(A). Because  depends on , there is a cuto level A() such
that, for a given value of , individuals for whom A  A() will invest in schooling
and all others will not. A() is implicitly given by equation (6b) with g and c (i.e.,
the production and the cost-of-eort functions) that do not depend directly on . So
substituting g = 0, c = 0, and CA = cA in equation (7) yields
dA
d
=  
1
2(g  A)
1
2(gA   1)E1   cA
; (14)
which, under the assumptions, is negative, just as in the case of the baseline model.
Now the equivalent of equation (8) for this model can be written as follows:
Ew (S) = 12E1

A+ K

+ 12(1 E1) + 12 (g(A) A)SE1: (15a)
Note that if g is allowed to depend on , as in the baseline model, then the only
change to the preceding equations will be to (14), where the numerator will now have
an extra term: 0:5gE1 that is positive.
15 Thus, dA=d remains negative. In this
case, equation (15a) becomes
Ew (S) = 12E1

A+ K

+ 12(1 E1) + 12 (g(A; ) A)SE1: (15b)
I discuss the implications of (15b) in the following section.
2.3. Implications and Relationship to the Empirical Specication
In translating the abstract model to an empirical specication, I associate eighth-
grade misbehavior with low values of  and associate high eighth-grade test scores
with high values of A. Because skills are measured during the eighth grade, these t
best with interpreting the endowments  and A in the model as corresponding to the
human capital accumulated by that time. Since the eighth-grade test was designed
to measure knowledge accumulated by this grade, it is natural to assume that the
eighth-grade test scores measure A; this interpretation suggests also that eighth-grade
misbehavior could measure .16
By assumption, in both models, an increase in A leads to an increase in cognitive
human capital. The interpretation is straightforward: those who are endowed with (or
have accumulated) a higher current stock of knowledge, will naturally end up with
greater knowledge.
15. Since g > 0, in this case the eort is increasing in  for the highly educated group, too.
16. This interpretation suggests that the eighth-grade measures are enough to describe the eighth-
grade stock of both types of human capital. It does not mean that, in the process of producing
each type of human capital, the other type was not used. Because I have no data to test for the
nature of that production process, this assumption seems best.
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The situation with noncognitive human capital is more subtle. The baseline model
postulates a positive relation between  and cognitive human capital, which suggests
that boys who do not do their school work know less. In the extended model, this is
a result not an assumption. In particular, individuals with higher values of  are
willing to pay the costs of eort and to behave well (in eighth grade) in order
to reap the future benets of higher cognitive human capital (and possibly higher
education). Conversely, students who misbehave could easily have the faculties needed
to accumulate as much knowledge as their fellow students who behave well, yet
misbehaving students { because of their their low discount rates { choose to put
in less eort and hence will have lower levels of cognitive human capital (which may
be manifested by lower tenth-grade test scores).17
The most straightforward interpretation of the schooling decision in the models is
whether to obtain a postsecondary degree. As long as  is related to , both models
imply that only individuals with suciently high endowment of both cognitive and
noncognitive human capital will invest in schooling. The models suggest that the
probability of obtaining a postsecondary degree is decreasing in misbehavior and
increasing in test scores. Moreover, individuals with (relatively) high cognitive human
capital will be the ones most aected by misbehavior. Even though their cognitive
skills are high enough to attend college, these individuals will decide against it because
they cannot bear the costs associated with good behavior and/or they discount the
future to such an extent that the costs, acquired in the present, outweigh the future
benets. In the educational attainment regression we therefore expect to nd, for high
education levels, a negative sign on the term for the interaction between the measures
of cognitive and noncognitive human capital.
Equation (8) and equation (15b) each imply that, conditional on cognitive ability,
those who misbehaved in eighth grade have lower earnings on average. Conditional
on eighth-grade misbehavior, those who had higher eighth-grade test scores have
higher earnings on average. Since g(A; )  A > 0, the last term in these equations
(i.e., 0:5[g(A; )   A]SE1) means that the correlation between cognitive human
capital and earnings is higher for highly-educated than for low-educated workers.18
17. There is direct evidence of positive correlations between test scores and impatience (e.g.,
Benjamin et al., forthcoming; Dohmen et al., 2011).
18. A similar relationship holds even in the most general case. In that case, we write the
cognitive human capital of workers with S = 0 as g(A; ; eS=0) and of workers with S = 1
as g(f(A); ; eS=1), where f(A) > A for all A and where e

S=i is the optimal eort level of a
worker with schooling i. Here, the equivalent to equation (15b), which we refer to as (15b*) is
Ew(S) = 0:5fE1g(A; ; eS=0)+ (1 E1)+[g(f(A); ; eS=1)  g(A; ; eS=0)]SE1g. Since those
who invest in schooling should have higher cognitive human capital, it follows that g(f(A); ; e) >
g(A; ; e); this implies g(f(A); ; eS=1)   g(A; ; eS=0) > 0. Therefore, the last term in (15b*) is
increasing in A, and thus highly-educated workers experience higher returns to cognitive human
capital than low-educated ones.
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Observe that if the worker's productivity depends on his contemporaneous eort
choice whereas his expected rewards are in the future (e.g., s greater likelihood of
keeping the job or receiving of promotion) then those with lower values of  (i.e.,
lower values of ) will invest less eort (i.e., shirk), which could explain why rms
would directly care about this specic noncognitive skill. This argument is similar to
the one in Bowles et al. (2001b).
Further implications depend on functional forms and modeling assumptions. For
example, if g(A; ) is nonseparable in A and  then the model suggests that there will
be an interaction term between the measures of cognitive and noncognitive human
capital for individuals who choose to acquire schooling. This is also the case if the
production function is not additive in eort and A. If K depends on A then we
should also expect, through the term =K, an interaction term between the measures
of cognitive and noncognitive human capital for workers with S = 0.19 While one
can derive specic predictions given other functional forms for g, these will depend
strongly on functional forms and modeling assumptions. For example, for the models
described above, if g is additive in A and  or if g does not depend on  then there will
be no interaction terms between cognitive and noncognitive human capital. However,
if the production function of cognitive human capital is multiplicative in eort {
so that HC = g(A; )e if S = 1 and HC = Ae otherwise { there will always be an
interaction term between cognitive and noncognitive human capital. In Section 4 I
will therefore discuss the functional form of g and the models that are supported by
the data described in Section 3.
3. Data
The data set used for the analysis is the National Educational Longitudinal Survey
(NELS) conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics. A nationally
representative sample of eighth-graders was rst surveyed in 1988, after which a
subsample of the respondents was surveyed again with four follow-ups in 1990, 1992,
19. Such an interaction term may exist also when KA = 0 if the basic model is extended to
allow cognitive human capital to depend on  even for workers with S = 0 (with the interpretation
that, between eighth grade and when postsecondary schooling decisions are made, individuals may
have acquired more cognitive human capital and that this process may depend on ). Equation
(9) thus becomes HC = g(A; ) + e if S = 0 and HC = g(f(A); ) + e if S = 1. Since those
who invest in schooling should have higher cognitive human capital, we need that f(A) > A and
g(f(A); ) > g(A; ) for all A and . To ensure this, we can assume that gA > 0 and f
0(A) > 1 or
that gAA > 0 and gA > 0; the only change is to equations (14) and (15b). Under the assumptions,
dA=d remains negative and (15b) becomes Ew(S) = 0:5f[g(A; ) + =K]E1 + (1   E1) +
[g(f(A); )  g(A; )]SE1g. This equation implies that there should be an interaction term between
cognitive and noncognitive human capital also for low-educated individuals when g is non-separable
in A and .
Journal of the European Economic Association
Preprint prepared on May 16, 2012 using jeea.cls v1.0.
Segal Misbehavior, Education, and Labor Market Outcomes 15
1994, and 2000. The study provides detailed family background data as well as
information about participants' activities before, during, and after high school. The
1994 and 2000 follow-ups contain detailed information on high school graduation
status, postsecondary education, and labor market outcomes. A test battery was
administered in the base year and in the rst two follow-ups. In addition, students'
teachers, parents, and school administrators were surveyed. Teacher evaluations of
student behavior were used to construct the behavioral variables, which are detailed
in the subsequent text.
Outcomes examined in the analysis include respondents' test scores in tenth grade
(based on data in the 1990 survey), educational attainments as of 2000 (from data
in the 1994 and 2000 surveys), and labor market outcomes as of 1999 (from data in
the 2000 survey). In addition, parental characteristics (taken from the 1988 parent
survey) are used as controls. The construction of these variables and their respective
means are described in Table WA2 of Web Appendix A.
3.1. Behavioral Measures
The measures of behavior used in the analysis are based on eighth-grade teacher
evaluations of student behavior in the classroom.20 Students were evaluated by two
of their teachers; the rst taught math or science, and the second taught English or
social science. The evaluations consist of yes/no answers to the following questions.
Is [the student] frequently absent? Is [the student] frequently tardy? Is [the student]
consistently inattentive in class? Is [the student] frequently disruptive? Does [the
student] rarely complete his homework?
The behavioral measures were coded such that low values correspond to good
behavior and high values to misbehavior. I use two measures in the analysis. In the
rst, each of the ve evaluations was coded as a dummy variable that takes the value 1
if at least one teacher indicated that the student misbehaved on the category and is set
to 0 otherwise. The means and the conditional means of these variables are reported in
(respectively) Tables WA1a and WA1b of Web Appendix A. For the second, the rst
principal component was used to construct a composite behavioral measure consisting
of the weighted sum of the ten teacher evaluations (ve per teacher);21 this is the
\misbehavior"variable. This variable was normalized to have weighted mean 0 and
20. The NELS also includes teacher evaluations for the tenth and twelfth grades. However, these
evaluations supply information on a smaller set of students (because of decreasing sample size by
design) that represent a selected sample (because some students participating in the NELS dropped
out of school after eighth grade). Furthermore, only a subset of teachers were asked to evaluate their
twelfth-grade students. It is for these reasons that I use only the eighth-grade teacher evaluations
in the analysis.
21. The weights are as follows: Tardiness: 0.26 and 0.27 for T1 and T2 (i.e., for teacher 1 and
teacher 2, respectively); Absenteeism: 0.25 and 0.26 for T1 and T2; Disruptiveness: 0.30 for both
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standard deviation of 1, for the sample of 9,335 male eighth-graders who in this
grade had two teacher evaluations as well as valid test scores. I use both the dierent
behavioral traits and the composite variable as explanatory variables in the analysis.22
Reliability of Teacher Evaluations. There is evidence in the literature suggesting that
teacher race and gender may bias their evaluation of some students (e.g., Dee, 2007;
Lavy, 2008). However, the studies that use the NELS and look at additional outcomes
(Ehrenberg et al., 1995; Dee, 2007) nd little evidence for biased teacher evaluations
of boys.23 So the teacher evaluations used here, besides being comprehensive and
helping to avoid self-reporting problems, seem also to be unbiased in this sense.
A dierent question is whether teacher evaluations of students' behavior are
related to the students' noncognitive traits. The evidence in Castillo et al. (2011)
reveals a relation between discount rates and disciplinary referrals. Therefore, as
long as teacher evaluations reect their records of how students behaved in the
classroom, one can reasonably suppose that teacher evaluations are indeed related
to their students' noncognitive traits. The evidence in psychology leads to similar
conclusions. Barbaranelli et al. (2003) demonstrate that teacher evaluations of their
junior high students matched similar reports made by the students and their mothers
regarding the students' personality traits and behavior. These authors show that
students' personalty traits (as assessed by their teacher) are correlated with the
behavior of these students (as reported by the teachers themselves, the students,
and their mothers). As mentioned in the introduction, Barbaranelli et al. (2003) also
document that low conscientiousness is correlated with both externalizing behavior
(including misbehavior in school) as well as low grades in school.
3.2. Test Scores
The NELS participants completed three sets of cognitive tests in each of the rst
three survey rounds. Since a substantial number of the twelfth-grade scores were
teachers; HW: 0.37 and 0.38 for T1 and T2; Inattentiveness: 0.36 and 0.37 for T1 and T2. In all
cases T1 denotes the math or science teacher and T2 the English or social science teacher.
22. The reported results remain qualitatively the same when I use a less detailed measure
(used in Figure 1 and Table 1) { namely, an indicator variable set equal to 1 if any teacher
reported misbehavior in any category. Additionally, when I add to the regressions that use the
ve misbehavior measures another ve dummy variables, each set equal to 1 only if both teachers
reported misbehavior in the category, these dummies are never jointly signicant in the regressions.
23. Ehrenberg et al. (1995) nd evidence that teacher race and gender are related to their
evaluation of girls only. While Dee (2007) nds that having a female teacher is negatively related
to eighth-grade teacher evaluations of boys' disruptiveness and homework completion, he also nds
that having a female teacher is negatively related to eighth-grade achievements of boys and decreases
boys' engagement with the teacher subject. This suggests that having a female teacher actually
aects boys' behavior in school and that the evaluations themselves are not biased.
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imputed, only the eighth- and tenth-grade test scores are used in analysis. Four
dierent subtests were developed for the NELS; they covered reading comprehension,
mathematics, science, and history/citizenship/geography. In addition, the NELS data
set contains a composite mathematics and reading test score. The tests were designed
to check whether students had the knowledge they were supposed to have acquired
by a certain grade. Specically, the rst (second) test battery, administered in 1988
(1990), was designed to test knowledge accumulated by the eighth (tenth) grade.
Studies that investigate the relationship between test scores and labor market
outcomes often use composite math and reading scores. To enable comparison between
this paper's results and those in the literature, I use the NELS- constructed composite
math and reading test scores. These composite scores were normalized to have
weighted mean 0 and standard deviation of 1 for the sample of 9,335 male eighth-
graders who had in this grade two teacher evaluations and valid test scores.
In Section 5.2, I use the tenth-grade composite math and reading test scores as
a proxy for cognitive human capital accumulated by the tenth grade. These scores
were likewise normalized to have weighted mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the
5,161 male tenth-graders who in this grade had two teacher evaluations and valid
test scores.24 In eighth grade, all participants were given the same test; in tenth
grade, however, multiple test forms were used. The purpose was to target potential
varying knowledge levels in the student population. Two forms of the reading test were
developed, and students who scored (in eighth grade) above the mean were given the
more dicult form. For the mathematics test, three forms were developed. The easiest
and the hardest of these forms were administered to students who had scored in the
lowest and highest quartiles, respectively, in eighth grade; students in the middle half
of the distribution received the test of middle diculty. The NELS administrators
employed item response theory (IRT) to facilitate comparisons between participants
who took dierent tests.
3.3. NELS Design Problems and Weights
Several feature of the NELS sample design are crucial for the analysis (for an excellent
summary, see Grogger and Neal, 2000). In the 1990, 1994 and 2000 follow-ups,
only a subsample of NELS participants was retained. The likelihood of a particular
24. Students who were not in tenth grade were excluded for the following reasons. Whereas more
than 95% of the in-school participants completed the test batteries, only about 50% of the dropouts
did so. In order to avoid selection issues in the dropout pool, only the test scores of the in-school
students were used. Moreover, the 1990 test battery was designed to measure knowledge acquired
by the tenth grade; by denition, ninth-grade students or dropouts (who did not learn the material)
have less knowledge. Excluding these students prevents them from driving the results { although
including these out-of-grade students does not qualitatively change the results reported in Section
5.2.
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student participating in any given survey was not determined at random. Instead,
it was determined by his dropout status and the quality of his response to past
questionnaires as well as his ethnicity/race and socioeconomic status. Because of these
nonrandom retention procedures, the resulting NELS sample is unrepresentative of
the US population { even within gender and race/ethnicity cells. Hence, the sample
weights supplied with the data set are used throughout the analysis. Specically, for
the outcomes analysis I use the weights that account for the sampling procedures
used from the 1988 survey through the 2000 survey. For the analysis in Section 5.2, I
use the weights that account for the sampling procedures used in the 1988 and 1990
surveys.
4. Outcomes
In this section, I present evidence of a meaningful economic association between
behavior in eighth grade and both educational and labor market outcomes for young
men. Table 1 presents the basic characteristics of the outcome variables of interest.
The table depicts the means of these variables, and then breaks them down in
terms of an eighth-grade misbehavior dummy set equal to 0 for all individuals whose
eighth-grade teachers both reported good behavior in all ve categories (and set to 1
otherwise). By this division, about 55% of male eighth-graders misbehaved.
Even the simple means convey a clear picture. For example, those who misbehaved
in eighth grade are almost 3 times more likely to drop out of high school and almost
3 times less likely to graduate from college. Eleven years later, those who misbehaved
in eighth grade earn on average 9.8% less per year and 8.5% less per hour than those
who behaved well. Using the binary indicator for misbehavior, I plot in Figure 1 the
kernel densities of earnings, hourly wages, and total hours worked in 1999 for the two
groups. The gure clearly indicates that the earnings and hourly wages distributions
of misbehaving students both lie to the left of the corresponding distribution for well-
behaved students. This supports the notion that individuals who misbehave in eighth
grade have worse labor market outcomes later in life. Because the two distributions
of total hours worked are very similar, the dierences in the outcomes are not the
result of leisure{work substitution.
The simple statistics just presented do not take other factors into account. In
particular, one cannot infer thereby whether eighth-grade misbehavior is associated
with educational outcomes once test scores and parental inputs are taken into account.
Nor do we know whether misbehavior is associated with labor market outcomes after
test scores and educational attainment are accounted for. Below I investigate these
questions in detail.
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Each of the empirical specications below takes the form
Outcomei = f (TSi;MBi;Xi; "i) ;
where i indexes individuals, Outcome is the outcome of interest, TS denotes eighth-
grade test scores andMB eighth-grade misbehavior, X is a vector of other covariates,
and " is an error term.
4.1. Educational Attainment as of 2000
I start by investigating the relationship between misbehavior in eighth grade and
educational attainment. The simple means in Table 1 suggest that misbehavior is
negatively correlated with both test scores and educational attainment. Further
descriptive evidence can be found in Figure 2, which depicts the cumulative
distributions of eighth-grade test scores and misbehavior by schooling levels as of
2000. The gure plots sorting by dierent education levels according to eighth-grade
test scores and the composite misbehavior variable. The left panel depicts a well-
known phenomenon: people who have higher test scores tend to acquire higher levels
of schooling. The right panel reveals a less known phenomenon: those who behave
better tend to have higher levels of schooling.
The models make predictions regarding the decision to acquire postsecondary
education, so I investigate this issue here. Thus I report the results from an empirical
(probit) model predicting the likelihood of acquiring postsecondary education { that
is, at least, an Associate of Arts (AA) degree. In Web Appendix B, I analyze in detail
the results of using a model that takes more educational choices into account.
The rst two columns of Table 2 report the marginal eects, evaluated at the
sample means, of the probit regression just described. In the rst column, the
composite misbehavior variable is used; in the second column the ve misbehavior
measures are used. Focusing on the rst column, we note that eighth-grade
misbehavior is signicantly and negatively associated with the probability of obtaining
a postsecondary degree.25 Thus, evaluated at the sample means, an increase of 1
standard deviation in eighth-grade misbehavior is associated with an 8.6% decrease
in the probability of graduating from college or obtaining an AA degree. This number
is of the same order of magnitude as the association between eighth-grade test scores
and acquiring a postsecondary degree. Since the predicted probability of obtaining
a postsecondary degree is itself 31.1%, the 1{standard deviation (thereafter, 1-SD)
increase in misbehavior represents a decrease of about 28% in this probability. When
25. The results presented in Web Appendix B conrm that the negative correlation is indeed
with obtaining a postsecondary education { in particular, a bachelor's degree { and not with the
likelihood of graduating from high school.
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the ve measures of misbehavior are used (in column 2) instead of the composite
variable, the ndings are similar. Even though the coecients for each of the ve
measures are not always statistically signicant, jointly they are signicant. Changing
one from being one of the best-behaved eighth-graders (i.e., all ve indicators of
misbehavior are 0) to being one of the worst-behaved eighth-graders (i.e., all indicators
are 1), is related to a 21.8% decrease in the likelihood of obtaining a postsecondary
degree.
The models suggest that individuals with relatively high knowledge are most
aected by misbehavior. As explained in Section 2.3, such students may forgo
college despite having sucient cognitive skills to pursue a higher education because
they have \too" low noncognitive skills. We thus expect to see a negative sign for
the interaction term between the measures of cognitive and noncognitive human
capital in the educational attainment regressions. Column 3 of Table 2 gives the
marginal eects at the sample means when this interaction term is added to the
specication of column 1. The interaction term is signicant and negative, as predicted
by the models. In particular, a 1-SD decrease in misbehavior is associated with a
9:1% + 3:8%  (test scores) increase in the likelihood of obtaining a postsecondary
degree. Thus, individuals who behave well benet the most (in terms of the probability
of obtaining a postsecondary degree) from having high test scores and, conversely,
those who misbehave benet the least.
The relationship between family background characteristics depict in Table 2 are
in accordance with the literature (see Cameron and Heckman, 2001; Jacob, 2002).26
Higher parental income is positively related to higher levels of education, as is
higher parental education.27 The table suggests that not living with both parents
is associated with a nearly 13.5% decrease in the predicted probability of obtaining a
postsecondary degree. After family background is controlled for, there seems to be no
gap in postsecondary educational attainment between blacks and whites.28 Although
these results may seem surprising, they are consistent with the literature. Jacob (2002)
reports similar ndings for the NLES; Cameron and Heckman (2001) nd that after
26. Family background characteristics are included in the regressions because they might provide
information on credit constraints faced by individuals. The values of these variables are taken from
the 1988 survey (when participants were in eighth grade). For the construction of the variables, see
Table WA2 in Web Appendix A.
27. There are some dierences between the Table 2 and the results presented in Web Appendix B
{ especially in the eect of parental education. These dierences are the result of a coarser division
of educational choices in Table 2.
28. Here, too, the results described in Web Appendix B are somewhat dierent. Specically: when
a ner division of education level is used, being black is associated with an even lower probability
of not graduating from high school and being Hispanic with an even higher probability of attending
some college. The dierence is again explained by the merging together of several education levels
in the regressions of Table 2.
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they control for family background characteristics in the 1979 National Longitudinal
Study of Youth (NLSY), minorities are more likely than whites to graduate from high
school and attend college.
The ndings reported in this paper indicate that eighth-grade misbehavior is
associated with lower educational attainment (once eighth-grade test scores and
family characteristics are controlled for). In additional regressions presented in Web
Appendix B that feature a ner division of educational attainment, I nd that
eighth-grade misbehavior has the strongest relationship with the probabilities of
graduating from college and of dropping out of high school, yet has weaker relationship
with the probability of obtaining other levels of schooling. The positive relationship
between dropping out of high school and misbehavior is to be expected. The negative
relationship between misbehavior and the probability of graduating from college
suggests that misbehavior may be indicative of more than a temporarily deant phase
in one's life.
4.2. Labor Market Outcomes: Earnings in 1999
Given the known relationship between higher education levels and labor market
success, we expect to nd a negative correlation between misbehavior in eighth grade
and labor market outcomes. Indeed, the raw statistics support this conjecture. In this
section, I investigate in detail the relationship between eighth-grade misbehavior and
earnings.
Table 3 presents the earnings regressions. The dependent variable is the ln of
earnings in 1999.29 The sample was restricted to include only males for whom eighth-
grade test scores and two teacher evaluations were available. It was restricted further
to include only individuals who were not enrolled in a postsecondary institution
after January 1999,30 were full-time workers, were not self-employed and reported
positive income in 1999.31 Columns 1 and 2 report the coecients from the earnings
regressions, which control for (respectively) demographics and eighth-grade test
29. Since the NELS participants were asked about their earnings in 1999 and not about their
hourly wage, I use the variable with an a priori smaller measurement error. The regression results
in which the dependent variable is the ln of hourly wage are both quantitatively and qualitatively
similar and can be found in my PhD dissertation (Segal, 2005).
30. Of all the male participants, 29% reported being in school after 1999. On average this group
behaved better in eighth grade and had higher eighth-grade test scores (the dierence in the means
{ of the eighth-grade misbehavior composite variable and the eighth-grade test scores { between
the two groups are 0.1 and 0.4 standard deviations, respectively).
31. Full-time workers are those who reported working at least one week in 1999 and an average
of at least 35 hours per week during the period worked. Of the 2,323 men who were not enrolled in
school and for whom valid test scores, behavior, and employment data are available, 2,240 (96.4%)
worked full-time. The regression results for all workers (i.e., with positive amount of hours) are
very similar qualitatively and quantitatively and can be found in Segal (2005).
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scores. These regressions document that, for the NELS data set as well, minorities
earn signicantly less; once test scores are controlled for, however, these dierences
are no longer signicant. Columns 3 and 4 add to the regression of column 2 the
eighth-grade misbehavior variables. Misbehavior in eighth grade is clearly associated
with a signicant reduction in earnings controlling for test scores: a 1-SD increase in
misbehavior (i.e., worse behavior) is related to a 6% decrease in earnings. Moreover,
the association between misbehavior and earnings has nearly the same magnitude
as the association between test scores and earnings: a 1-SD decrease in eighth-grade
test scores is associated with a 5.4% decrease in earnings. The results are similar
when I use the ve misbehavior measures. Even though the coecients on each of the
ve measures are not always signicant by themselves, jointly they are statistically
signicant.32 The change from being one of the best-behaved (i.e., all ve misbehavior
indicators are 0) to one of the worst-behaved eighth-graders (i.e., all indicators are
1), is associated with a 20.6% decrease in earnings.
In Columns 5 and 6, years of schooling completed by 1999 are added to the
regressions. Comparing column 5 to column 3 shows that after years of schooling
completed are controlled for, the coecient for misbehavior is reduced in size {
although it remains statistically signicant and economically large: a 1-SD increase
in misbehavior is associated with a 4% decrease in earnings.33 Column 6 uses the ve
misbehavior measures whose coecients are again jointly signicant.34 The change
from being one of the worst-behaved to one of the best-behaved eighth-graders,
ceteris paribus, is related to a 18.4% increase in earnings. These decreased magnitudes
indicate that the relation between misbehavior and labor market outcomes is partly
mediated by the relation between misbehavior and educational attainment.
Once education levels are controlled for, neither statistically nor economically
signicant associations between eighth-grade test scores and earnings are found in
the data (columns 5 and 6 in Table 3). This result does not stem from adding the
misbehavior measures to the regressions. After years of schooling completed are added
to column 2's regression, the coecient for eighth-grade test scores is small (0.023)
and insignicant. The last three columns of Table 3 address this issue. In column
7, the coecients for test score are allowed to vary between those who obtain a
32. The coecient for disruptiveness in column 2 is positive. This coecient is negative, however,
when disruptiveness is the only measure of behavior, suggesting that the positive sign is due to
correlations between the ve measures.
33. The change in statistical signicance is not the result of less precise estimation, as the standard
errors of the misbehavior coecients hardly change. Rather, it is the point estimate that is being
reduced in magnitude by about a third.
34. Comparing columns 6 and 4, we observe that the traits that have the strongest association with
educational attainment (i.e., homework completion and absenteeism) are reduced in magnitude the
most when education is controlled for.
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postsecondary degree (a category that includes the AA degree) and those who at
most had just some college education. The gures clearly indicate that higher eighth-
grade test scores are associated with higher earnings only for those males who obtain
postsecondary degrees.35 It seems that once education is controlled for, test scores
do not correlate with earnings for those who have mo more than \some" college
education.36 Columns 8 and 9 add the dierent eighth-grade misbehavior measures
to the regressions. The coecient for misbehavior is large and statistically signicant:
a 1-SD increase in misbehavior is associated with a 4.3% decrease in earnings. The
ve measures are, again, jointly signicant, and the increase in earnings associated
with turning one from being one of the worst-behaved to one of the best-behaved
eighth-graders is 19.1%.37
The regressions reported in the last three columns of Table 3 are in accordance
with the models' predictions that associations between test scores and earnings will be
larger for those who obtain a postsecondary degree. The models yield other predictions
that are not tested in Table 3. Specically, depending on the functional form of
the cognitive human capital production function, we may expect the associations
between misbehavior (i.e., noncognitive human capital) and earnings to depend on
the schooling level and may also expect an interaction term between misbehavior
and test scores in the earnings regressions. Below, I use the composite misbehavior
variable to test for these predictions.
The rst column of Table 4 tests for the most general form of cognitive human
capital production function. Thus, it includes interaction terms between eighth-grade
test scores and misbehavior that vary by education levels, and it allows both test
scores and misbehavior to vary by education level. In the table's second column, the
interaction term is constrained to be the same across education levels; in the third
column, the interaction term relates to the earnings of highly educated men only
35. The dierence between the two coecients for test scores is signicant (p = 0:0014), and
jointly they are signicantly dierent from zero (p = 0:0013).
36. Segal (forthcoming) reports similar ndings for male NLSY participants. Specically, she nds
that the association between Armed Forces Qualication Test (AFQT) scores and earnings in 2003
is twice as strong for men who graduated from college as for men with lower educational attainment.
37. So far I have treated the misbehavior measures as absolute measures, yet it is possible that
the teachers answered questions on student behavior in a relative manner. In Table WC1 of Web
Appendix C, I investigate this issue by taking advantage of the NELS sample's inclusion of multiple
students from each school. I restrict the sample further to include only those schools in which at
least two students had valid data, so about 10% of the sample used in Table 3 is discarded. The rst
four columns of Table WC1 present the basic earnings regressions for the restricted sample, and the
last four columns present the regression with eighth-grade school xed eects. Adding school xed
eects to the earnings regressions does not change the main ndings on the association between
eighth-grade misbehavior and earnings. Moreover, the regression results show that eighth-grade
schools are related both to educational attainment and to eighth-grade test scores. This nding
may serve as indirect evidence for the importance of school quality or of sorting of students to
eighth-grade schools.
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(as predicted by the models). The results in Table 4 conrm that test scores are
correlated only with earnings of highly educated men. In contrast, the associations
between misbehavior and earnings are practically the same for all men (although
the coecients are less precisely estimated for the highly educated). Moreover, the
rst three columns suggest that there is no interaction term between cognitive and
noncognitive human capital. Yet because this lack of interaction could result from
(erroneously) specifying that misbehavior varies across education levels, columns
4 to 6 repeat the regressions with misbehavior constrained to be the same across
education levels. The results remain unchanged { in other words, there is no signicant
interaction term between eighth-grade test scores and misbehavior in the earnings'
regressions. Column 7 conrms that indeed the associations between misbehavior and
earnings are the same across education levels; it also suggests that the specication of
column 8 of Table 3 is a correct one, since the coecients for eighth-grade misbehavior
are literally the same across education levels. Thus, the preferred specications for
the rest of this paper are the two presented in columns 8 and 9 of Table 3.
Taken together, the results presented in Table 4 { specically, the lack of
interaction term { are consistent with models in which the production function of
cognitive human capital does not depend directly on noncognitive human capital.
These results are also consistent with a cognitive human capital production function
that is additive in eort and with a cost-of-eort function that does not depend
on cognitive human capital. Although one cannot rule out the possibility that
noncognitive human capital (related to misbehavior) is a direct input in the
production function of cognitive human capital, the results in Table 4 put limitations
on this possibility. In particular, the lack of dierential associations between eighth-
grade misbehavior and earnings across education levels suggests the following. If
misbehavior is indeed a direct input in the production function of cognitive human
capital, then it must enter not only additively but also it has the same functional form
for cognitive human capital produced in high school and in postsecondary education.38
5. Channels
This section explores the possible explanations for the associations between
misbehavior and economic outcomes. First I consider economic explanations that
38. To see this note rst that the last term in equation (15b) suggests that if g(A; ) = g(A)+ h()
then  should be more strongly correlated with earnings of highly educated workers. Hence in
order for  to be an input in the production function and for the results of Table 4 to hold,
we must be in the world described in footnote 19. Thus, in this case, the last term of (15b) is
g(f(A); )  g(A; ); for g to be additive in A and , it must be that g(f(A); ) = g(f(A)) + h()
and g(A; ) = g(A) + h().
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imply that these relationships do not stem from eighth-grade misbehavior causing
worse economic outcomes. I then provide evidence that misbehaving eighth-graders
have worse tenth-grade test scores. However, neither a boy's background nor his
above-average knowledge in eighth grade can alleviate this eect. Taken together this
suggests boys who misbehaved in eighth grade most likely kept misbehaving and not
only that misbehavior results in less accumulated cognitive human capital. It thus
seems that misbehavior in eighth grade is an indication of one's type, and it is this
type that (to a large extent) determines the individual's behavior in school and the
workplace.
5.1. Taste for Occupation or Education
In this section, I investigate whether misbehavior is merely a by-product of an omitted
variable that itself is causally related to outcomes. Below, I investigate whether
tastes and expectations are these omitted variables. The mechanism of this channel
is similar to the one discussed in the extended model. Specically, suppose that
eighth-graders have dierent tastes for dierent occupations, irrespective of their
skills. Schooling and/or knowledge acquired in school is not a prerequisite for some
of these occupations, so eighth-graders who aspire only to such jobs may decide not
to invest eort in school. Similarly, suppose that eighth-graders have dierent tastes
for education, regardless of their skills; those with no taste for schooling may decide
not to invest eort in school. Less eort will result in less knowledge, which (all else
being equal) leads to lower future earnings. The NELS eighth-grade respondents were
asked: \What kind of work do you expect to be doing when you are 30 years old?"
They were also asked: \As things stand now, how far in school do you think you will
get?" I can therefore test these two hypotheses directly. The regression results are
presented in Table 5.
The rst two columns of Table 5 report the results from the preferred specications
(i.e., of columns 8 and 9 of Table 3) for a restricted sample that includes only
eighth-graders who reported their expected occupation at age 30. In columns 3 and
4, dummies for each category of expected occupation are added. The coecients
for eighth-grade misbehavior are essentially the same, which means that there is no
evidence that the association between eighth-grade misbehavior and earnings results
from taste dierences with respect to future occupations.39
Columns 5 and 6 report results from the preferred specications for a restricted
sample that includes only eighth-graders who reported their expected education at
39. In specications where dummies for the categories \not working", \do not know", and \other"
were added, the results were essentially the same.
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age 30,40 and the last two columns of Table 5 add the variable \expected years
of schooling" to the regressions. The coecients for eighth-grade misbehavior are
essentially the same, so there is likewise no evidence that the association between
eighth-grade misbehavior and earnings stem from dierences in tastes for education.
If test scores measure one's cognitive ability, then the results reported in Table
5 directly rule out the following channel: eighth-graders with low cognitive ability
realize that the occupation in which they could succeed as adults are those requiring
only low levels of human capital (or realize that they could not succeed much further
in school); hence they decide to misbehave in school. If this were the case, then adding
eighth-grade test scores to the earnings regressions would have rendered eighth-grade
misbehavior insignicant.
5.2. Cognitive Human Capital Accumulation
Another possible explanation is that misbehavior in school interferes with cognitive
human capital accumulation. All inputs in the production function of human capital
should aect test scores. The inputs that received the most attention are cognitive
ability, school quality, and (to the extent it is not captured by those) parental
characteristics. In addition to these factors, all educators agree that doing one's
schoolwork contributes to one's knowledge. Thus, students who misbehave in eighth
grade may learn less and, as a result, will have lower cognitive human capital.
The NELS data set contains two test batteries designed to measure knowledge that
students are supposed to have accumulated by eighth and tenth grades. I use these
test scores as measures of cognitive human capital in order to examine directly the
relationship between eighth-grade misbehavior and knowledge accumulation by the
tenth grade. In addition, I allow tenth-grade test scores to be aected by school
quality (captured by eighth-grade school dummies in the regressions) and eighth-
grade parental characteristics. Thus, I estimate the model: TS10ij = j + Xij +
MBMBij + TSTS
8
ij + "ij , where i indexes individuals and j indexes the eighth-
grade schools. Here the dependent variable TS10 denotes the tenth-grade standardized
test scores, the j are the school specic coecients, X is a vector of demographics
and family characteristics; TS8 denotes the eighth-grade standardized test scores,
MB denotes measures of eighth-grade misbehavior, and " is an error term.
40. The answers were translated to expected years of schooling via this coding procedure: \Won't
nish high school" was coded as 11 years of schooling; \Will nish high school or attend vocational,
trade, or business school after high school" was coded as 12 years of schooling; \Will attend
college" was coded as 13 years of schooling; \Will nish college" was coded as 16 years of schooling,
and \Higher schooling after college" was coded as 18 years of schooling. In parallel specications
where dummies were included for each possible answer, the results were both qualitatively and
quantitatively the same.
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Table 6 reports the results. The rst three columns omit the eighth-grade test
scores from the regressions. Column 1 includes only family characteristics and eighth-
grade school dummies; in columns 2 and 3, the misbehavior measures are added.
Column 1 reveals the expected relationship between family characteristics and tenth-
grade test scores. Columns 2 and 3 suggest that part of that relationship is mediated
by eighth-grade misbehavior, since the point estimates on family characteristics
are decreasing once eighth-grade misbehavior is added to the regressions. Eighth-
grade misbehavior is associated with lower tenth-grade test scores. This relationship
is of the same order of magnitude as the relationship between family background
characteristics and tenth-grade test scores and is statistically signicant (again, the
ve measures of eighth-grade misbehavior are jointly signicant). Columns 4 and 5
add the eighth-grade test scores. The results indicate that eighth-grade misbehavior
still correlates with tenth-grade test scores. Both the composite misbehavior
variable and the ve misbehavior measures are statistically signicant, but only
the race/ethnicity dummies and the family composition dummy remain signicant
and large. One can thus infer that the correlations of eighth-grade misbehavior with
educational attainment and with earnings may be due in part to less human capital
accumulated by the students who misbehaved in eighth grade.41
The evidence suggests that misbehavior results in lower cognitive human capital.
However, in order to understand the relationship between misbehavior and earnings,
we must establish whether or not misbehavior in eighth grade alone { that is, without
any further incidents of misbehavior { is enough to account (via continued loss of
cognitive human capital) for the lower earnings observed for misbehaving boys later
in their lives. If it is enough, then a boy who experienced a negative shock in eighth
grade will have lower tenth-grade test scores even if he behaved extremely well in ninth
grade.42 Therefore, in the rest of this section I investigate whether the relationship
depicted in the rst ve columns of Table 6 can be the result of the boys' misbehavior
41. Not all tenth-graders took the same test, so it is possible that the relationship between eighth-
grade misbehavior and tenth-grade test scores reects this fact. In particular, it may be that the IRT
procedure, applied by the NELS administrators, assigned a too-low compatible score to individuals
with low eighth-grade scores and that this creates the associations found in the data. If that were
the case, then misbehavior may not actually aect human capital accumulation (which in turn
suggests that this channel cannot explain the relationship found in the data). When the regressions
in column 4 are repeated by subgroups that took the same tests in tenth grade, I nd that eighth-
grade misbehavior is signicantly associated with tenth-grade scores for all groups other than the
worst one (i.e., students in the lowest eighth-grade quartile of math scores and with below-average
reading scores).
42. Examples of such shocks are illness or the death of a relative while in eighth grade, but also
a specic eighth-grade taste for occupation, aversion to school, or erroneous expectation regarding
the future.
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only in eighth grade.43 If the eight-grade misbehavior was an isolated incident then
one would expect to nd two other relationships in the data. First, families with
more resources may be able to help their children \catch up." Thus, higher family
income or highly educated parents might have a positive inuence on tenth-grade
test scores even after eighth-grade test scores and misbehavior are controlled for. Yet
this is not the case: once eighth-grade test scores and misbehavior are controlled for,
the statistical and economic signicance of these family characteristics is essentially
zero.44 Second, one would expect that youth with higher eighth-grade test scores
(i.e., who have acquired more cognitive human capital by eighth grade) would
cope better { in other words, would have higher tenth-grade test scores { even if
they misbehaved in eighth grade. Column 6 investigates this issue by allowing the
coecients for eighth-grade test scores and misbehavior to vary independently for
those students with above-average eighth-grade test scores. There is no evidence in
the data supporting the conjecture that higher initial levels of cognitive human capital
reduce the association between eighth-grade misbehavior and tenth-grade test scores.
If anything, misbehavior in school most hurts those with above-average eighth-grade
test scores. Hence, it seems that those youth who have accumulated more cognitive
human capital by eighth grade pay the highest price, in terms of their tenth-grade
test scores, for misbehavior. This result suggests that lower human capital levels are
caused by school misbehavior that is continuing and not limited to the eighth grade.
Thus, even misbehaving students with above-average eighth-grade test scores cannot
catch up with their well-behaved peers and so will continue to accumulate human
capital at lower rates.
5.3. Person-specic Type
The last explanation suggested for the empirical ndings in this paper is the
existence of a person-specic type that is the origin of misbehavior in eighth grade.
Specically, I suggest that eighth-grade misbehavior proxies for personality traits that
are important in the labor market.
The empirical evidence suggests that employers value workers who display good
work habits and that they are also willing to expend resources to avoid hiring workers
who will display counterproductive work behaviors (Bishop, 1993; Bewley, 1999;
43. Note that if there were two groups of boys, the permanently-misbehaving and the misbehaving-
in-eighth-grade-only, then if one-shot misbehavior had no eect on future outcomes then the results
obtained previously would be biased downward.
44. Recall that there is a positive association between family income and educational attainment.
Therefore, if resource-rich families help their boys catch up but disadvantaged families cannot (and
hence their sons drop out), then we should expect to nd no relationship between eighth-grade
misbehavior and tenth-grade test scores in the selected sample used in Table 6.
Journal of the European Economic Association
Preprint prepared on May 16, 2012 using jeea.cls v1.0.
Segal Misbehavior, Education, and Labor Market Outcomes 29
Roberts et al., 2007; Autor and Scarborough, 2008).45 Roberts et al. (2007) nd
that individuals who were less conscientious at 18 were more likely to engage in
counterproductive work behavior, which includes being late to work, pretending to
be sick, having conicts with the boss, and doing things that could get them red.46
Therefore, it is possible that the personality trait proxied by eighth-grade misbehavior
is conscientiousness.
Castillo et al. (2011) nd that eighth-graders with higher discount rates have
higher rates of disciplinary referrals. Consistent with the hypothesis that misbehavior
is indicative of one's type or stable characteristics, the authors report that impatient
eighth-graders are also more likely to have disciplinary referrals in ninth grade; this
nding suggests that the discount rate is the link between eighth-grade misbehavior
and outcomes. Specically: since behaving well in school is costly and the benets
are not immediate, it could be that students with low discount rates do not nd it
worthwhile to acquire these costs and instead misbehave. It may likewise be that
the same individuals do not nd it worthwhile to bear the costs of behaving well in
the workplace because they discount the future benets to a large extent and hence
display inappropriate behavior.
It is worth noting that these two interpretations are compatible. In particular,
individuals who are more conscientious are more self-controlled and able to plan.
Having a high discount rate means that one values the future and therefore is able
to delay gratication (for high enough future rewards). Hence, it seems likely that
individuals with high discount rates are more conscientious.47
6. Conclusions
In this paper I exploit the NELS data set to investigate the associations between
childhood behavior and cognitive human capital { as measured, respectively, by
misbehavior in school and performance on achievement tests { with adult economic
success. The measures of childhood misbehavior are based on detailed teacher
45. The value to the employer could stem from higher productivity related to good behavior, from
higher morale in the workplace that in turn increases productivity as in Bewley (1999), or from
reducing enforcement costs (as in Bowles et al., 2001b). This latter explanation is in agreement
with the extended model, as those with low values of  (i.e., noncognitive skills) value the future
benets of keeping their job to a lesser degree and hence are more likely to shirk.
46. The authors also nd that individuals rated low on agreeableness - a term that reects
individual dierences in the tendency to be altruistic, trusting, modest, and warm (Roberts
et al., 2004) { and in particular, those who are highly aggressive, are more likely to display
counterproductive behaviors in the workplace.
47. Ameriks et al. (2007) use the gap between ideal and expected consumption as an economic
measure of self-control and temptation avoidance and show that it is positively related to both
wealth accumulation and conscientiousness.
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evaluations of eighth-graders' behavior. That allows me to avoid problems associated
with noncognitive skills measures that are self-reported, reective, or that are
concurrent with the outcomes of interest, which may have biased results in previous
studies. The good behavior required in school seems, moreover, strongly similar to the
good behavior valued in the workplace, and evidence in the literatures of economics
and psychology suggest that misbehavior in school is related not only to low discount
rates but also to low conscientiousness.
The empirical analysis shows the importance of good behavior in eighth grade
for economic success beyond the impact of eighth-grade test scores. Eighth-grade
misbehavior is associated with lower educational attainment even after controlling for
eighth-grade test scores and family background characteristics. Misbehavior in eighth
grade is negatively correlated with earnings. Controlling in addition for educational
attainment, I nd a direct relationship between eighth-grade misbehavior and
earnings that accounts for nearly two thirds of the overall correlation. Furthermore,
misbehavior in eighth grade is associated with earnings for all workers whereas
performance on the eighth-grade achievement test is associated with earnings only
for workers who obtain postsecondary degree. These ndings are not driven by boys'
tastes for future occupation or schooling. These associations are due in part to
misbehaving boys accumulating less knowledge. However, it is probable that eighth-
graders who misbehave continue to do so both in school and in the workplace and
that this behavior explains most of the associations in the data.
The results indicate that, at least after eighth grade, the production function of
cognitive human capital does not directly depend on the noncognitive skills examined
in this paper. Instead, the dependence arises from high discounting of the future,
which results in little eort investment in schooling and in misbehavior. The results
also imply to an additive in eort production function and to an eort cost function
that does not depend directly on any form of human capital. Of course, these results
may not be applicable to other forms of noncognitive skills that may aect human
capital accumulation and economic success through dierent mechanisms. Nor do
they suggest that the production function of cognitive human capital is unchangeable
at earlier ages.
The forms of misbehavior investigated in this paper may seem harmless, but
the ndings suggest that misbehavior in the classroom has substantial negative
associations with boys' future earnings and educational attainment. Given the large
magnitude of the associations found between misbehavior and outcomes and given
that more than half of the boys in the NELS sample misbehave, it is tempting to
suggest policies that target misbehavior in addition to, or even instead of, cognitive
skills. The evidence in Segal (2008) indicates that, at least after eighth grade,
misbehavior in school is quite persistent. It is possible that behavior in school at
younger ages is more malleable; the evidence in Cunha and Heckman (2008) suggests
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that in early childhood both cognitive and noncognitive skills are malleable and that
noncognitive skills remain malleable until later ages. Without a better understanding
of childhood misbehavior and the channels through which the associations between
school misbehavior and outcomes arise, any policy recommendation would be
premature. More data on childhood behavior and its relation to adult outcomes would
shed light on some of these open questions.
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Figure 1. Kernel densities for the two types of behavior (where \Well Behaved" is a dummy set
equal to 1 only if both teachers reported good behavior in all ve categories; see text for details).
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Figure 2. The weighted cumulative distribution of eighth-grade test scores and misbehavior by
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text for details).
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Table 2. Relationship between eighth-grade misbehavior and the probability of obtaining a
postsecondary degree by 2000: marginal eects after probit, evaluated at the sample means.
[1] [2] [3]
Test Scores 0.109 0.107 0.096
[0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.018]***
Misbehavior {0.086 {0.091
[0.021]*** [0.019]***
Tardya 0.076
[0.076]
Absenta {0.099
[0.039]**
Disruptivea {0.049
[0.037]
Does Not Complete Homeworka {0.126
[0.038]***
Inattentivea {0.02
[0.040]
Test Scores  Misbehaviorb {0.038
[0.018]**
Blacka 0.032 0.039 0.03
[0.070] [0.070] [0.068]
Hispanica 0.045 0.035 0.044
[0.048] [0.048] [0.048]
Father High School Dropouta {0.105 {0.091 {0.102
[0.047]** [0.046]** [0.045]**
Father College Graduate or Morea 0.09 0.086 0.088
[0.038]** [0.038]** [0.037]**
Mother High School Dropouta {0.071 {0.078 {0.069
[0.041]* [0.042]* [0.040]*
Mother College Graduate or Morea 0.142 0.147 0.142
[0.033]*** [0.032]*** [0.033]***
Family Income (in $10,000) 0.021 0.021 0.02
[0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]***
Does Not Live with Both Parentsa {0.143 {0.135 {0.137
[0.030]*** [0.030]*** [0.029]***
Number of Siblings {0.017 {0.017 {0.018
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
Joint Test: Behavior 41.3
Prob. > 2 <0.001
Observations 3,852 3,852 3,852
Predicted Prob. at the Sample Means 0.311 0.031 0.302
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by eighth-grade school) in brackets. The sample is restricted to
include only those students with data on test scores, two teacher evaluations, and data on all the family
background characteristics. Misbehavior measures and Test Scores are for the eighth grade.
a. The marginal eect is for a discrete change of a dummy variable from 0 to 1
b. Marginal eect for this interaction term is evaluated at the respective mean of each variable.
Signicant at 10%; **signicant at 5%; ***signicant at 1%.
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Table 6. Relation between tenth-grade test scores and eighth-grade misbehavior.
Dependent Variable: Tenth-Grade Test Scores
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Eighth-Grade Test Scores 0.820 0.818 0.913
[0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.028]***
8th Grade Test Scores: Above- {0.160
Average 8th Grade Test Scores [0.041]***
Eighth-Grade Misbehavior {0.312 {0.083 {0.059
[0.027]*** [0.015]*** [0.018]***
8th Grade Misbehavior: Above- {0.057
Average 8th Grade Test Scores [0.028]**
Tardy 0.053 {0.000
[0.096] [0.047]
Absent {0.073 {0.007
[0.067] [0.034]
Disruptive {0.174 {0.047
[0.051]*** [0.027]*
Does Not Complete Homework {0.284 {0.080
[0.051]*** [0.028]***
Inattentive {0.267 {0.068
[0.055]*** [0.027]**
Black {0.442 {0.391 {0.385 {0.082 {0.080 {0.074
[0.082]*** [0.080]*** [0.080]*** [0.041]** [0.041]** [0.041]*
Hispanic {0.249 {0.225 {0.206 {0.106 {0.100 {0.104
[0.092]*** [0.087]*** [0.087]** [0.041]*** [0.041]** [0.040]**
Father High School Dropout {0.121 {0.094 {0.087 {0.016 {0.015 {0.015
[0.065]* [0.065] [0.064] [0.032] [0.033] [0.032]
Father College Grad or More 0.321 0.276 0.267 0.029 0.027 0.025
[0.051]*** [0.049]*** [0.049]*** [0.027] [0.027] [0.027]
Mother High School Dropout {0.179 {0.176 {0.181 {0.022 {0.024 {0.024
[0.067]*** [0.066]*** [0.065]*** [0.034] [0.034] [0.034]
Mother College Grad or More 0.163 0.147 0.148 0.018 0.018 0.026
[0.050]*** [0.047]*** [0.048]*** [0.027] [0.027] [0.027]
Family Income in $10,000 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.002
[0.007]* [0.007]* [0.007] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Does Not Live with Both Parents {0.163 {0.109 {0.111 {0.081 {0.082 {0.078
[0.047]*** [0.047]** [0.047]** [0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.022]***
Number of Siblings {0.030 {0.025 {0.025 {0.007 {0.008 {0.008
[0.014]** [0.014]* [0.014]* [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Constant 0.105 0.018 0.299 {0.070 0.006 {0.015
[0.049]** [0.049] [0.049]*** [0.024]*** [0.026] [0.030]
Joint Test: Behavior 36.35 7.79
Prob. > F <0.001 <0.001
School Dummiesa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,440 3,440 3,440 3,440 3,440 3,340
R2 0.43 0.47 0.48 0.84 0.84 0.85
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. The sample is restricted to include only those students with
data on test scores, two teacher evaluations in both grades, and data on all the family background
characteristics. The sample is further restricted to include only those eighth-grade schools containing at
least two students with valid data. Misbehavior measures are for eighth grade.
a. Jointly signicant in all specications.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
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